Is it possible to mathematically extract an AES key from black-box encrypt/decrypt hardware? Planned maintenance scheduled April 23, 2019 at 23:30 UTC (7:30pm US/Eastern) Announcing the arrival of Valued Associate #679: Cesar Manara Unicorn Meta Zoo #1: Why another podcast?Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair?Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintextdecrypt AES without whole keyIs my understanding of CPA indistinguishability experiment correct?Decrypt AES-encrypted data with another keyBreak AES-CFB mode having access to a AES-CTR black boxIs CBC mode with a fixed IV secure, if a counter is prepended to the plaintext?Decrypt AES key with RSA public keyWhy is Byte-at-a-time ECB decryption a vulnerability?AES encryption using a Diffie-Hellman questionPublic-private algorithm where it is not possible to recover public key from private key?Recovery of private key in AES-CBC from two ciphertexts with different IV, but identical plantext
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Is it possible to mathematically extract an AES key from black-box encrypt/decrypt hardware?
Planned maintenance scheduled April 23, 2019 at 23:30 UTC (7:30pm US/Eastern)
Announcing the arrival of Valued Associate #679: Cesar Manara
Unicorn Meta Zoo #1: Why another podcast?Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair?Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintextdecrypt AES without whole keyIs my understanding of CPA indistinguishability experiment correct?Decrypt AES-encrypted data with another keyBreak AES-CFB mode having access to a AES-CTR black boxIs CBC mode with a fixed IV secure, if a counter is prepended to the plaintext?Decrypt AES key with RSA public keyWhy is Byte-at-a-time ECB decryption a vulnerability?AES encryption using a Diffie-Hellman questionPublic-private algorithm where it is not possible to recover public key from private key?Recovery of private key in AES-CBC from two ciphertexts with different IV, but identical plantext
$begingroup$
I presented our mathematician with an idea:
If you have a black box that encrypts or decrypts AES with the same 128 bit key (you don't have any direct access to the key), and you control the input and the direction (enc/dec) and can see the output,
can you mathematically derive the key? How many tests will you have to run to be able to derive the key?
He said he remembers there was a paper that said it will take only $2^16$ tries to derive the key. Does this paper exist? Dan anybody point me in the right direction?
aes chosen-plaintext-attack chosen-ciphertext-attack key-recovery
$endgroup$
add a comment |
$begingroup$
I presented our mathematician with an idea:
If you have a black box that encrypts or decrypts AES with the same 128 bit key (you don't have any direct access to the key), and you control the input and the direction (enc/dec) and can see the output,
can you mathematically derive the key? How many tests will you have to run to be able to derive the key?
He said he remembers there was a paper that said it will take only $2^16$ tries to derive the key. Does this paper exist? Dan anybody point me in the right direction?
aes chosen-plaintext-attack chosen-ciphertext-attack key-recovery
$endgroup$
2
$begingroup$
This seems like almost a duplicate of Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintext and Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair? except that those questions ask about known-plaintext rather than chosen-plaintext attacks. The answers are effectively the same, though.
$endgroup$
– Ilmari Karonen
Apr 3 at 10:24
1
$begingroup$
Only with side channel attacks like power analysis. Otherwise it is infeasible
$endgroup$
– Natanael
Apr 4 at 0:02
$begingroup$
Any chance this relates to the lack of AES' information theoretic security? 65,536 IO pairings may well completely determine a mathematical model of the interior of the box. Simultaneous equation solving would then theoretically allow key recovery much more readily than brute force. Does this sound familiar at all?
$endgroup$
– Paul Uszak
Apr 4 at 0:38
add a comment |
$begingroup$
I presented our mathematician with an idea:
If you have a black box that encrypts or decrypts AES with the same 128 bit key (you don't have any direct access to the key), and you control the input and the direction (enc/dec) and can see the output,
can you mathematically derive the key? How many tests will you have to run to be able to derive the key?
He said he remembers there was a paper that said it will take only $2^16$ tries to derive the key. Does this paper exist? Dan anybody point me in the right direction?
aes chosen-plaintext-attack chosen-ciphertext-attack key-recovery
$endgroup$
I presented our mathematician with an idea:
If you have a black box that encrypts or decrypts AES with the same 128 bit key (you don't have any direct access to the key), and you control the input and the direction (enc/dec) and can see the output,
can you mathematically derive the key? How many tests will you have to run to be able to derive the key?
He said he remembers there was a paper that said it will take only $2^16$ tries to derive the key. Does this paper exist? Dan anybody point me in the right direction?
aes chosen-plaintext-attack chosen-ciphertext-attack key-recovery
aes chosen-plaintext-attack chosen-ciphertext-attack key-recovery
edited Apr 3 at 10:53
AleksanderRas
3,0221937
3,0221937
asked Apr 3 at 9:34
Anton VainerAnton Vainer
253
253
2
$begingroup$
This seems like almost a duplicate of Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintext and Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair? except that those questions ask about known-plaintext rather than chosen-plaintext attacks. The answers are effectively the same, though.
$endgroup$
– Ilmari Karonen
Apr 3 at 10:24
1
$begingroup$
Only with side channel attacks like power analysis. Otherwise it is infeasible
$endgroup$
– Natanael
Apr 4 at 0:02
$begingroup$
Any chance this relates to the lack of AES' information theoretic security? 65,536 IO pairings may well completely determine a mathematical model of the interior of the box. Simultaneous equation solving would then theoretically allow key recovery much more readily than brute force. Does this sound familiar at all?
$endgroup$
– Paul Uszak
Apr 4 at 0:38
add a comment |
2
$begingroup$
This seems like almost a duplicate of Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintext and Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair? except that those questions ask about known-plaintext rather than chosen-plaintext attacks. The answers are effectively the same, though.
$endgroup$
– Ilmari Karonen
Apr 3 at 10:24
1
$begingroup$
Only with side channel attacks like power analysis. Otherwise it is infeasible
$endgroup$
– Natanael
Apr 4 at 0:02
$begingroup$
Any chance this relates to the lack of AES' information theoretic security? 65,536 IO pairings may well completely determine a mathematical model of the interior of the box. Simultaneous equation solving would then theoretically allow key recovery much more readily than brute force. Does this sound familiar at all?
$endgroup$
– Paul Uszak
Apr 4 at 0:38
2
2
$begingroup$
This seems like almost a duplicate of Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintext and Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair? except that those questions ask about known-plaintext rather than chosen-plaintext attacks. The answers are effectively the same, though.
$endgroup$
– Ilmari Karonen
Apr 3 at 10:24
$begingroup$
This seems like almost a duplicate of Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintext and Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair? except that those questions ask about known-plaintext rather than chosen-plaintext attacks. The answers are effectively the same, though.
$endgroup$
– Ilmari Karonen
Apr 3 at 10:24
1
1
$begingroup$
Only with side channel attacks like power analysis. Otherwise it is infeasible
$endgroup$
– Natanael
Apr 4 at 0:02
$begingroup$
Only with side channel attacks like power analysis. Otherwise it is infeasible
$endgroup$
– Natanael
Apr 4 at 0:02
$begingroup$
Any chance this relates to the lack of AES' information theoretic security? 65,536 IO pairings may well completely determine a mathematical model of the interior of the box. Simultaneous equation solving would then theoretically allow key recovery much more readily than brute force. Does this sound familiar at all?
$endgroup$
– Paul Uszak
Apr 4 at 0:38
$begingroup$
Any chance this relates to the lack of AES' information theoretic security? 65,536 IO pairings may well completely determine a mathematical model of the interior of the box. Simultaneous equation solving would then theoretically allow key recovery much more readily than brute force. Does this sound familiar at all?
$endgroup$
– Paul Uszak
Apr 4 at 0:38
add a comment |
1 Answer
1
active
oldest
votes
$begingroup$
What you describe is Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) and AES and secure block ciphers are designed to be secure against this.
Having $2^16$ chosen-plaintext under one key doesn't help you to extract the AES key. You have to go to the full-brute force to find the key.
Since you have one target, you cannot get help from attacking many keys simultaneously. In some cases, the black box may reside in many days in front of you, thus, during those days, you will get many target keys.
For $t$ targets, the expected cost breaking one of the $t$ keys is $2^128/t$ and that will be far below $2^128$. If you have a billion target (~$2^30$) the cost will be ~$2^98$ to find one of the target keys.
$endgroup$
add a comment |
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1 Answer
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$begingroup$
What you describe is Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) and AES and secure block ciphers are designed to be secure against this.
Having $2^16$ chosen-plaintext under one key doesn't help you to extract the AES key. You have to go to the full-brute force to find the key.
Since you have one target, you cannot get help from attacking many keys simultaneously. In some cases, the black box may reside in many days in front of you, thus, during those days, you will get many target keys.
For $t$ targets, the expected cost breaking one of the $t$ keys is $2^128/t$ and that will be far below $2^128$. If you have a billion target (~$2^30$) the cost will be ~$2^98$ to find one of the target keys.
$endgroup$
add a comment |
$begingroup$
What you describe is Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) and AES and secure block ciphers are designed to be secure against this.
Having $2^16$ chosen-plaintext under one key doesn't help you to extract the AES key. You have to go to the full-brute force to find the key.
Since you have one target, you cannot get help from attacking many keys simultaneously. In some cases, the black box may reside in many days in front of you, thus, during those days, you will get many target keys.
For $t$ targets, the expected cost breaking one of the $t$ keys is $2^128/t$ and that will be far below $2^128$. If you have a billion target (~$2^30$) the cost will be ~$2^98$ to find one of the target keys.
$endgroup$
add a comment |
$begingroup$
What you describe is Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) and AES and secure block ciphers are designed to be secure against this.
Having $2^16$ chosen-plaintext under one key doesn't help you to extract the AES key. You have to go to the full-brute force to find the key.
Since you have one target, you cannot get help from attacking many keys simultaneously. In some cases, the black box may reside in many days in front of you, thus, during those days, you will get many target keys.
For $t$ targets, the expected cost breaking one of the $t$ keys is $2^128/t$ and that will be far below $2^128$. If you have a billion target (~$2^30$) the cost will be ~$2^98$ to find one of the target keys.
$endgroup$
What you describe is Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) and AES and secure block ciphers are designed to be secure against this.
Having $2^16$ chosen-plaintext under one key doesn't help you to extract the AES key. You have to go to the full-brute force to find the key.
Since you have one target, you cannot get help from attacking many keys simultaneously. In some cases, the black box may reside in many days in front of you, thus, during those days, you will get many target keys.
For $t$ targets, the expected cost breaking one of the $t$ keys is $2^128/t$ and that will be far below $2^128$. If you have a billion target (~$2^30$) the cost will be ~$2^98$ to find one of the target keys.
edited Apr 6 at 16:04
answered Apr 3 at 10:07
kelalakakelalaka
8,88032351
8,88032351
add a comment |
add a comment |
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$begingroup$
This seems like almost a duplicate of Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintext and Is it possible to obtain AES-128 key from a known ciphertext-plaintext pair? except that those questions ask about known-plaintext rather than chosen-plaintext attacks. The answers are effectively the same, though.
$endgroup$
– Ilmari Karonen
Apr 3 at 10:24
1
$begingroup$
Only with side channel attacks like power analysis. Otherwise it is infeasible
$endgroup$
– Natanael
Apr 4 at 0:02
$begingroup$
Any chance this relates to the lack of AES' information theoretic security? 65,536 IO pairings may well completely determine a mathematical model of the interior of the box. Simultaneous equation solving would then theoretically allow key recovery much more readily than brute force. Does this sound familiar at all?
$endgroup$
– Paul Uszak
Apr 4 at 0:38